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One of the key insights of relational contract theory is that context matters — in all
contracts, but particularly in long-term commercial ones. The use of context in the
interpretation of contracts appears to be on the rise in South Africa, in line with increased
subjectivity in contract adjudication. Interesting parallels can be drawn with the shifting
sands of contract interpretation in the UK, where contextualism is on the rise, but remains
controversial. Indeed, even the concept of good faith is under discussion in English law,
particularly with regard to relational contracts. Appropriate construction of the agreement
seems to be the favoured approach to achieve results which make ‘commercial common
sense’. This article will also draw on the English reception of relational contract theory.
These comparative insights will then be applied in a discussion of the proper approach to
South African contract adjudication, using a case study of the Everfresh case, which is a
leading example of a post-constitutional relational contract dispute.
I INTRODUCTION
Relational contract theory exists today in many hybrid forms, with propo-
nents in several jurisdictions.1 Indeed, the insight that relationships and
context matter in contracting should hardly come as a surprise to any
member of the human race. The origins of this theory are described in almost
mystical terms by adherents as having arisen under the auspices of Professors
Macaulay and Macneil, who independently developed a new socio-legal
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1 The literature is fairly extensive. By way of introduction, see the essays collected
in David Campbell (ed) The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil
(2001); Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Con-
tracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (2013); David Campbell, Linda Mulcahy & Sally
Wheeler (eds) Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (2016).
For a South African perspective, see: Luanda Hawthorne ‘Relational contract theory:
Is the antagonism directed at discrete exchanges and presentiation justified?’ in
Graham Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 137 and ‘The first traces of
relational contract theory — The implicit dimension of co-operation’ (2007) 19 SA
Merc LJ 234.
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theory during the 1960s and 1970s as to how to view contracting.2 These
scholars focused on the inter-dependence of the parties to commercial
contracts and their ensuing business practices, rather than strict doctrinal
law.3 The resultant relational theory hence makes empirical sense and rings
true with the human experience, which allows it to be transposed to new
settings.4
This article will consider mostly materials from the English legal system by
way of comparison, due to the strong parallels in court structure and legal
culture to South Africa.5 There are, of course, key post-constitutional
differences between these countries too, but this article will argue that
English insights are useful in analysing commercial contracts and the disputes
related to these. Relational contract theory has also had a deeper impact in
the UK than in South Africa (at least in the academic discourse6) although
I would argue that many of the central tenets of relational theory fit very
nicely with the post-constitutional approach to contract adjudication in
South Africa.7 Indeed, by way of example, South Africa has seen a clear shift
from literalism to contextualism in the judicial interpretation of legal texts.8
I shall also argue that there is an increased awareness of subjective contextual
2 Parts of the history can be gleaned from David Campbell ‘Ian Macneil and the
relational theory of contract’ in Campbell (ed) op cit note 1 at 3. See also the brief
preface by Jean Braucher & William Whitford in Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford op
cit note 1 at vii.
3 See the sources in note 2 above, as well as the collections listed in note 1.
4 Clear evidence of the transposable nature of relational contract theory may be
gleaned from its impact in the UK: a perusal of the above works will only scratch the
surface of a detailed UK literature on relational theory. The author refers the reader to
works of scholars like David Campbell, Roger Brownsword, Hugh Collins, John
Wightman and Catherine Mitchell.
5 For an historical overview of the impact of English law on South African law,
the reader is referred to Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross:
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996).
6 The English Court of Appeal rejected the tenets of the relational theory of
contract in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274 (see
para 16). In that case, a long-term supply relationship, which had extended over
several decades, but was based on a ‘partnering’ arrangement, rather than a detailed
long-term contract, was held not to give Baird any rights other than those contained
in the overall umbrella agreement. M&S were thus entitled to stand on the letter of
their contract as written, despite the lengthy relationship, and terminate the partner-
ing agreement.
7 This will be briefly illustrated in part IV below, and applied in part V.
8 With regard to contractual interpretation in particular, see Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) paras 17–26; Bothma-
Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA) paras 10–12; Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 (1) SA 518
(SCA) paras 24–31. With regard to statutory interpretation, see (by way of example)
the Constitutional Court dicta in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd. In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit
NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) paras 21–6; African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral
Commission 2006 (3) SA 305 (CC) paras 20–5; Department of Land Affairs & others
v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) paras 51–5. In a private-
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factors in other aspects of contract adjudication in the post-constitutional
era.9 This rise of context in contract adjudication is paralleled by develop-
ments in the UK, most famously espoused by the Law Lords Hoffmann and
Steyn.10 The position of contextualism and related doctrines such as
‘commercial common sense’, ‘reasonable expectations’, and even good faith
remains controversial in that jurisdiction, however.11 South African legal
culture is also ambivalent about these concepts, although our Constitutional
Court seems to be leading us in that direction.12
The aim of this article is very briefly to describe the key insights of
relational contract theory and then to explore the links between this concept
and contextualism. The UK case law will be used to illustrate this connection
as a comparative study of a jurisdiction with a conservative judicial culture
and strong historical links to South African law. Finally, by way of
illustration, the insights obtained in the theoretical and comparative excursus
will be applied to an analysis of South African law and the controversial
Constitutional Court decision in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd.13
II CONCEPTUALISING THE INQUIRY
The first step in developing an argument about the potential role of context
in South African contract law is to position this article against certain other
broad discussions in the contract literature. I provide brief definitions of how
law context, see the approaches of the various judgments in: National Credit Regulator
v Opperman 2013 (2) SA1 (CC).
9 This view will not be developed in great detail, but see by way of example the
Constitutional Court dicta concerning the factual circumstances of the parties in
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras 64–7; Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments
777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA479 (CC) paras 73–6.
10 This point will be developed in detail below with regard to the jurisprudence
and personal writings of both of these Lord Justices.
11 See on interpretation Christopher Staughton ‘How do the courts interpret
commercial contracts?’ (1999) 58 Cambridge LJ 303; Martin Hogg ‘Fundamental
issues for reform of the law of contractual interpretation’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh LR 406.
See on good faith Ewan McKendrick ‘Good faith in performance of a contract in
English law’ in Larry A DiMatteo & Martin Hogg (eds) Comparative Contract Law:
British and American Perspectives (2016) 196; David Campbell ‘Good faith and the
ubiquity of the relational contract’ (2014) 77 MLR 460; Simon Whittaker ‘Good
faith, implied terms and commercial contracts’ (2013) 129 LQR 463.
12 On the good faith question in SA, see (ex pluribus) Reinhard Zimmermann
‘Good faith and equity’ in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) op cit note 5 at 217; Dale
Hutchison ‘Good faith in the South African law of contract’ in Roger Brownsword,
Norma J Hird & Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context
(1999) 213; Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights
and its implications for the development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395. For
Constitutional Court dicta on good faith in contract, see: Barkhuizen supra note 9
paras 79–82 (per Ncgobo J); Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)
Ltd 2012 (1) SA256 (CC) para 72; Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA124 (CC) paras 45–6.
13 Supra note 12.
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certain concepts will be used, to facilitate the understanding of what is to
follow. The following descriptions are only short summaries of what is an
extensive literature.
(a) Relational contracts and relational contract theory
Relational contract theory is an off-shoot of the inter-disciplinary study of
law, particularly by socio-legal scholars, and was initially formulated in the
United States.14 The major insight of this school of thought is that doctrinal
contract law is only one aspect of the process of contracting and that there are
broad social and economic aspects to this everyday institution as well.15
Hence, to study doctrinal law alone misses a large part of the world of
contracting, and doctrinal contract law may be out of touch with the
practicalities of contracting in business and other contexts. As this brief
introduction will hopefully make clear, relational contract theory is thus
largely focused on contextualising contracts within the broader factual matrix
of background circumstances.16
(i) Relational contract theory
As stated in the introduction, the initial proponents of relational contract
theory were US scholars Macaulay and Macneil. Macaulay is famous for his
empirical studies of commercial contracting practices.17 By interviewing
businessmen and their lawyers, he developed key insights into commercial
contracting, the foremost of which was that doctrinal law is not at the
forefront of much commercial contracting and that business relationships
were far more important.18 Indeed, most businessmen only involved lawyers
in their contracts once relationships had completely broken down.19
Macneil developed an elaborate socio-legal theory of contracting, involving
key insights such as that there is a difference between one-off contracts,
where relationships were largely irrelevant (‘discrete transactions’) and
longer-term contracts which were highly relationship dependent (‘relational
14 See by way of introduction the sources listed in note 1.
15 The archetypal account of this possible incongruence is Stewart Macaulay
‘Non-contractual relations in business — A preliminary study’ (1963) 28 American
Sociological Review 55. See further for a UK example: Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale
‘Contracts between businessmen: Planning and the use of contractual remedies’
(1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45.
16 A detailed discussion of the role of context in commercial contracting can be
found in Catherine Mitchell Contract Law and Contract Practice: Bridging the Gap
between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation (2013). For a briefer account from
a UK perspective, see John Wightman ‘Contract in a pre-realist world: Professor
Macaulay, Lord Hoffmann and the rise of context in the English law of contract’ in
Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford (eds) op cit note 1 at 377.
17 The classic example of his work is the article cited above in note 15. Some
selected samples of his scholarship, as well as a full list of his publications may be found
in Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford op cit note 1.
18 See Macaulay’s conclusions in op cit note 15.
19 Ibid at 61.
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contracts’).20 Macneil’s argument was that doctrinal (‘classical/neoclassical’)
contract law concerned itself largely with discrete contracts and that the formal
process of contractual negotiation and conclusion involved anticipating and
planning for future events (‘presentiation’) at the time of entering into the
contract.21 In a long-term, relational contract, Macneil argued, it was difficult
fully to predict the future over a long period of time, and hence norms like
reciprocity, trust and co-operation were extremely important in this type of
contract.22 Indeed Macneil developed a theory that most contracts were more
toward the relational than the discrete end of the continuum, along with a list
of ten ‘common contract norms’ which governed the process of contracting
from a socio-legal point of view.23 His central argument was that doctrinal
contract law should be developed to allow greater resort to relational norms
and should thus be less formalist and more standards-based.24 Indeed Macneil
described a progression from the ‘classical’ contract law as developed in the
early part of the twentieth century in the USA before the rise of legal realism
(he mentions Williston as a key proponent); through to the ‘neo-classical’
contract law introduced by realists (such as Llewellyn and Corbin), which
incorporated greater flexibility, such as purposive interpretation of contracts
and implied duties of good faith in contracting; to a ‘relational’ contract law,
where contracts would be secondary to business relationships.25 The final stage
is not formally part of US, UK or SouthAfrican contract law, but evidence of it
can be seen in commercial practice, such as: ‘partnering’ arrangements in the
construction industry;26 the ‘networks’ phenomenon studied by students of
20 These ideas are central to Macneil’s work on relational contracts. See by way of
example Ian R Macneil ‘The many futures of contracts’ (1974) 47 Southern California
LR 691 and The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations
(1980). For a South African summary of these ideas see the work of Hawthorne op cit
note 1.
21 Macneil 1974 Southern California LR ibid 800–4; Macneil The New Social Con-
tract ibid at 19. For a discussion of the differences between ‘classical’, ‘neo-classical’
and ‘relational’ contract law, see Ian Macneil ‘Contracts: Adjustment of long-term
economic relations under classical, neo-classical and relational contract law’ (1978) 72
Northwestern University LR 854.
22 See Macneil The New Social Contract ibid, particularly with reference to the
‘common contract norms’at 39–59.
23 Ibid. The norms are listed in The New Social Contract as: (1) role integrity;
(2) reciprocity; (3) implementation of planning; (4) effectuation of consent; (5) flexi-
bility; (6) contractual solidarity; (7) the restitution, reliance and expectation interests;
(8) creation and restraint of power; (9) propriety of means; and (10) harmonization
with the social matrix. (Some of these require further explanation — the reader is
referred to the cited work, which explains each norm in full.)
24 See the argument advanced in 1974 Southern California LR op cit note 20 at
805–16 (‘Postscript’). See further Macneil The New Social Contract ibid at 72–7.
25 This argument is clearly set out in Macneil 1978 Northwestern University LR op
cit note 21.
26 By way of example of legal authority for this approach, see the standard form
NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract, which is widely used in certain
sectors of the construction industry in both the UK and SA. See further Mears Ltd v
Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2015] EWHC 1396 (TCC).
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management and business;27 and the concept of an ‘umbrella’ agreement as can
be seen in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc.28 This article discusses
the rise of neo-classical contract law in South Africa and the UK, rather than
the socio-legal contract behaviour of pure relational contract theory, a
distinction which will be explained in part II(a)(iii) below.
(ii) Relational contracts
Although Macneil viewed most contracts as having a relational aspect to
them, this article will discuss relational contracts in a narrower sense of
specifically long-term, relationship-dependent contracts.29 Some examples
would be ongoing relationships between suppliers of raw materials and
manufacturers; the relationship between franchisor and franchisee; the
relationship between lessor and lessee under a lease; and the bank-customer
relationship. Other classic examples are employment relationships and
marriage — surely two of most relationship-dependent contracts in society
(to the extent that marriage constitutes a ‘contract’).30 This article will focus
on commercial relational contracts, however, and will ignore employment
and consumer contracts, which are subject to detailed statutory regulation
and are hence niche areas in their own right.31
In relational contracts changes in circumstances and the effluxion of time
make it necessary to continue to engage with the other contracting party in
order to preserve the viability of the contract for both parties.32 Thus a spirit
of trust and co-operation is necessary to facilitate contract performance.33
This is relationship dependent: while the black-letter law of doctrinal
contract may not be sufficiently developed to take account of this relational
law of contracting, it nevertheless is a vital part of the factual matrix of the
27 For legal scholarship on networks, see the essays collected in Marc Amstutz &
Gunther Teubner (eds) Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (2009).
28 Supra note 6. See further on umbrella agreements: Stefanos Mouzas & Michael
Furmston ‘From contract to umbrella agreement’ (2008) 67 Cambridge LJ 37.
29 Compare the arguments of Jay Feinman ‘Relational contract theory in context’
(2000) 94 Northwestern University LR 737 at 739–40 and Ewan McKendrick ‘The
regulation of long-term contracts in English law’ in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann
(eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 305.
30 This is discussed by Macneil 1974 Southern California LR op cit note 20 at
720–25.
31 See the list of statutes in note 132 below.
32 The question of how to deal with changes in circumstances over time is dis-
cussed from an English perspective in McKendrick op cit note 29.
33 See the discussion in Simon Deakin, Christel Lane & Frank Wilkinson ‘Con-
tract law, trust relations, and incentives for co-operation: A comparative study’ in
Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie (eds) Contracts, Co-operation, and Competition
(1997) 105.
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contract.34 In order to facilitate the ongoing contractual relationship (so the
argument goes), the doctrinal law should be flexible enough to allow the
parties to structure their relations and to plan for the future.35 This is why
some relational scholars advocate for standards such as ‘good faith’ or
‘reasonable expectations’ to be used in resolving relational contract dis-
putes.36 This may be as an express or tacit term of the contract, or even a term
implied by law.37
(iii) Contract behaviour versus contract law
A final point to be aware of when approaching the relational contract
literature, or even a superficial account of it (such as this one) is that there is a
clear formal distinction between contract behaviour and contract law.38
Contract behaviour is the field of socio-legal studies and is not necessarily
concerned with doctrinal law.39 Contract law is a more positivist study of
what is the appropriate law to govern relational contracts and involves
arguing for developments of the doctrinal law to take account of the findings
of socio-legal studies. This article is of the latter variety. Use will be made of
insights from relational studies to argue for adaptation of the doctrinal law,
through the use of context and more flexible legal standards.
(b) Context and its uses
Since this article aims at developing contract doctrine, rather than discussing
legal theory or business practices, this discussion of relational contracts will
34 Compare the discussion of the role of black-letter law in relational contracts in
Lisa Bernstein ‘Merchant law in a merchant court: Rethinking the Code’s search for
immanent business norms’ (1995–1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania LR 1765. For a
defence of black-letter law in the face of relational theory, see Richard Austin-Baker
‘A relational law of contract?’ (2004) 20 J of Contract Law 125.
35 This is a key argument explored in Mitchell op cit note 16. McKendrick op cit
note 29 at 332 argues that this problem is best addressed through contract drafting (by
the use of force majeure or hardship clauses for example) or by consumer legislation.
36 See for example Catherine Mitchell ‘Interpreting commercial contracts: The
policing role of context in English law’ in DiMatteo & Hogg (eds) op cit note 11 at
231 (arguing for contextual interpretation to incorporate contract policing standards);
John Wightman ‘Good faith and pluralism in the law of contract’ in Brownsword,
Hird & Howells (eds) op cit note 12 at 41 (defending the important distinction
between commercial and consumer contracts).
37 This description draws on the English common law of contracting. In South
Africa, there could potentially even be an enforceable duty of good faith as a generally
applicable rule of contract law, given our Roman-Dutch basis of contracting. This
does not appear to be the position at present, but the question of a duty of good faith
in contract law has been raised by the Constitutional Court: see the cases cited above
at note 12.
38 This point is made forcefully by Austen-Baker op cit note 34 at 125–6 and
underlies the discussion in David Campbell’s introduction in Campbell (ed) op cit
note 1 and Mitchell op cit note 16.
39 The relevance of this distinction can be seen from the impact of Macaulay’s
socio-legal research in fields outside of law. See for a brief account the preface to
Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford op cit note 1 at vii.
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be grounded squarely on existing approaches to taking account of the
surrounding factual matrix. In South African (and English) law this is usually
discussed under the debate about the extent to which ‘context’ can be used in
contractual disputes, particularly during the construction of the contract
phase.40 The focus will be on contractual interpretation, with a residual focus
on the use of standards such as good faith and reasonable expectations in this
phase of construction of the contract.
(i) Literalism versus contextualism
The modern South African case law on contractual (as well as statutory)
interpretation evidences a clear shift from literalism to contextualism.41
Literalism is often viewed in South Africa as an evil, to be associated with our
formalist past.42 Of course, formalism has been shown to be an approach not
sufficiently nuanced enough to deal with a given dispute and has led to
injustices, particularly in the field of statutory interpretation.43 In contractual
interpretation there are still many proponents of literal interpretation, who
argue that the ‘four corners’ approach leads to contractual certainty, which is
good for ex ante planning, insurance of risks, and hence commerce in
general.44 These themes will be developed below.
In South Africa, a contextual approach to contractual interpretation now
has the stamp of approval of our highest courts, so there is no need for this
article to argue further for the merits of this approach; but this issue will be
touched on below in part IV.45 Suffice it to say that in the South African
contractual setting, ‘context’ would include the rest of the contract, back-
ground and surrounding circumstances to the transaction, as well as of course
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.46 This would be tempered, however,
40 On the use of context in contractual interpretation in South Africa see Malcolm
Wallis ‘What’s in a word? Interpretation through the eyes of ordinary readers’ (2010)
127 SALJ 673. For a UK perspective, see Ewan McKendrick Contract Law: Text,
Cases, and Materials 6 ed (2014) 366–84.
41 See the cases cited above at note 8.
42 Compare (from a statutory interpretation perspective) Lourens du Plessis
Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) ‘Prolegomenon’ vii–xviii; Christo Botha Statutory
Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 5 ed (2012) 12–14; G E Devenish Interpreta-
tion of Statutes (1992) 26–33 and 290–1. Compare the negative sentiments about the
literal interpretation of contracts in Wallis op cit note 40 at 677–8.
43 The classic example of this is S v Kola 1966 (4) SA 322 (A). Compare the use of
formalism by the majority in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530,
however, for a contrary result.
44 An interesting book which develops this type of argument is Rob Merkin
& Jenny Steele Insurance and the Law of Obligations (2013) ch 7, particularly at 168–70.
For a convincing defence of formalism in contract law, see Jonathan Morgan Contract
Law Minimalism: A Formalist Restatement of Commercial Contract Law (2013).
45 See the cases cited in note 8 above.
46 This statement of the law is derived from Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra
note 8 paras 24–6. The Bill of Rights is not mentioned there, but given the
supremacy clause (s 2 of the Final Constitution) this is definitely a contextual factor to
bear in mind in an appropriate case. See generally Wallis op cit note 40.
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by the parol evidence rule and the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
of prior contractual negotiations;47 as well as express clauses stating that the
written contract constitutes the ‘entire agreement’, or a ‘no representations’
clause.
(ii) Subjective versus objective approaches to contract
A related discussion to the role of context is the proper theoretical approach
to take to contract interpretation. Is the law concerned with the inner
motives and subjective intentions of a contracting party (as per the will
theory), or his or her outwardly professed intention (as per the declaration
and reliance theories)?48 English law of course is famous for its objective
approach to contract formation and interpretation.49 Indeed, the ‘reliance
theory’ as expounded in Smith v Hughes50 is a commonly referenced English
export often discussed in the South African case law and literature on
contract.51 In South Africa, the continental ‘will theory’ is part of our
Roman-Dutch heritage, but has been tempered by the influence of English
law in this country, as well as the decline of the ‘will theory’ world-wide.52
The academic discourse on mistake in contract is an informative starting
point for researching these topics in South Africa.53
In the field of legal interpretation, the prevailing view in this country
seems to be that contracts and statutes are to be interpreted objectively.54 This
is also the position in English law.55 Essentially this means that rather than
47 Van Aardt v Galway 2012 (2) SA 312 (SCA) para 9 (per Wallis JA). For the UK
view, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 paras 28–47, per
Hoffmann LJ.
48 See (for example): Chris-James Pretorius ‘The basis of contractual liability in
SouthAfrican law’ (2004) 67 THRHR 179, 383 and 549.
49 See for textbook authority Edwin Peel Treitel — The Law of Contract 14 ed
(2015) at 1-002 and 6-009; McKendrick op cit note 40 at 19–42 and 375.
50 (1871) LR 6 QB 597 (CA).
51 See Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at
239H–I; Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA)
para 17; Dale Hutchison ‘Contract formation’ in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) op cit
note 5 at 187–93; Pretorius op cit note 48 at 188–92.
52 Dale Hutchison op cit note 51 (1996) 180–93. For a classic account of the
decline of the will theory and classical contract law from a more international per-
spective, see P SAtiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979), especially ch 22.
For a US perspective, see Grant Gilmore The Death of Contract (1974).
53 See for example Pretorius op cit note 48 and Hutchison op cit note 51.
54 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 8 para 18 (discussing both contracts
and statutes). For an approach which makes room for the subjective influence of
context (including the intentions of the parties) on the construction of the contract,
see the unanimous judgment of Lewis JA in Novartis supra note 8 paras 27–31. In her
personal capacity, Lewis has argued that South African law tempers the objective
approach to interpretation received from English law with a measure of (Roman-
Dutch) subjectivity, introduced by means of consideration of the context of a con-
tract. See Carole Lewis ‘Interpretation of contracts’ in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) op
cit note 5 at 195.
55 See McKendrick op cit note 40 at 366–84.
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consider the subjective (and possibly never expressed) intentions and motives
of a party, the law should consider the actual text used to set out the
contractual terms, as it would be understood by the reasonable reader of that
text, with all the contextual knowledge which the parties had at the time of
the transaction.56 This, of course, is not a purely objective approach, and has
been labelled ‘subjective objectivity’ by some commentators.57 When com-
bined with a resort to the ‘commercial common sense’ rule,58 I believe that
objective interpretation is capable of dealing with the nuances of relational
theory, since there is still scope for relational norms to influence interpreta-
tion, without resort to subjective intention. Whether a standard such as
commercial common sense should include further aspects of honesty, fair
dealing, reasonable expectations, or even good faith, is a factor which will be
explored below with regard to the English literature.
(iii) Substance and form
The overall concern of modern constitutional contract law in South Africa
appears (in the views of some) to be a search for social justice, and possibly
even fairness inter partes.59 The latter is a much debated point in the
academic literature. Should the law have regard to the underlying substance
of a transaction and use broad standards to achieve fairness on a case-by-case
basis, or are contractual certainty and ex ante planning more important, so
that clear rules need to be set out by the courts?60 This is an ongoing dispute,
not only in South Africa, but also in the world literature on contract.61
Relational theorists (as stated above) typically argue for flexible standards to
be used in contract adjudication, whether as generally applicable principles of
56 This is the first rule of interpretation stated by Lord Hoffman in Investor’s Com-
pensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society ICS [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at
912. See text below in part III(b).
57 See for example Hogg op cit note 11 at 408. Note the distinction here from
Wallis op cit note 40 at 675–7, who describes this type of contextual approach as
‘objective’. The difference in terminology may lie in the different traditional starting
points of English and South African law on contractual interpretation. For a South
African example of a ‘subjective objectivity’-type approach, see the work of Lewis,
discussed above at note 54. See further: Catherine Maxwell ‘Interpretation of con-
tracts’ in Dale Hutchison & Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South
Africa 2 ed (2012) 271–3.
58 See part III(b) below.
59 Compare the views of Dennis M Davis & Karl Klare ‘Transformative constitu-
tionalism and the common and customary law’ (2010) 26 SAJHR 403; Jaco Barnard-
Naudé ‘Of Dorothy’s dog, ‘poststructural’ fairy tales ... and the real: Power, poverty
and the general principles of the SouthAfrican law of contract’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 469;
Deeksha Bhana ‘The role of judicial method in contract revisited’ (2015) 132 SALJ
122.
60 The classic source is Duncan Kennedy ‘Form and substance in private-law adju-
dication’ (1975–1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685. See also Alfred Cockrell ‘Substance and
form in the SouthAfrican law of contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40.
61 Compare for a trans-Atlantic perspective the debates about good faith in
DiMatteo & Hogg (eds) op cit note 11 chs 10–11.
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contract doctrine, or as a more context-specific backdrop to the construction
of contractual obligations.62 This is possibly explained by the nature of
long-term relational contracts, in which co-operation is necessary and terms
are often deliberately left vague to facilitate future adaptation to changing
circumstances.63
(c) The link to relational theory
The link between discussions of ‘context’ and ‘relational theory’ appears to lie
in the use of flexible standards derived from the parties’ own dealings and
environment to facilitate the use of relational norms in contract adjudication
and dispute resolution generally. Relational theory does not require fairness
inter partes — instead what is required is that business norms of a particular
contracting community are preserved.64 In other words, contextual concepts
such as trade customs and industry norms should play a key role. It should be
stressed that some relational-contract scholars are from the law-and-
economics movement and hence have a more market-driven focus, based on
economic efficiency.65 Judges in both the UK and South Africa have called for
commercial contract adjudication to take account of commercial practices.66
There is scope for this type of argument within the relational contract fold.
Increased contextual sensitivity, particularly in long-term relational con-
tracts, can achieve this end, while at the same time promoting norms such as
reciprocity and good faith.67 This increased sensitivity has been achieved in
62 See Roger Brownsword ‘After Investor’s: Interpretation, expectation and the
implicit dimension of the ‘‘new contextualism’’ ’ in David Campbell, Hugh Collins &
John Wightman (eds) Implicit Dimensions: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts
(2003) 103; John Wightman ‘Good faith and pluralism in the law of contract’ in
Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) op cit note 12 at 41; Campbell op cit note 11.
63 Compare the facts of the case of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation
Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) (contract drafted in broad terms by the parties them-
selves without legal help); the standard ‘duty to negotiate in good faith clause’, com-
plete with deadlock-breaking arbitration provision, as discussed in Southernport
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA); and hardship clauses,
commonly used in drafting long-term contracts.
64 Brownsword op cit note 62; Campbell et al op cit note 62; Wightman op cit
note 62.
65 The differences between ‘law and society’ and ‘law and economics’ scholars of
relational contract theory are explored in detail in Robert E Scott ‘The promise and
peril of relational contract theory’ in Braucher, Kidwell & Whitford op cit note 1 at
105.
66 In South Africa, see F D J Brand ‘The role of good faith, equity and fairness in
the South African law of contract: The influence of common law and the Constitu-
tion’ (2008) 126 SALJ 77; Carole Lewis ‘The uneven journey to uncertainty in
contract’ 2013 (76) THRHR 80; Malcolm Wallis ‘Commercial certainty and consti-
tutionalism: Are they compatible?’ (2016) 133 SALJ 545. In the UK, see Lord Devlin
‘The relation between commercial law and commercial practice’ (1951) 14 MLR
249; Lord Goff ‘Commercial contracts and the commercial court’ [1984] Lloyd’s
Maritime & Commercial LQ 382; Lord Steyn ‘Contract law: Fulfilling the reasonable
expectations of honest men’ (1997) 113 LQR 433.
67 Compare the argument of Mitchell op cit notes 16 and 36.
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the UK through adjustment of the theoretical approach to contractual
interpretation.68 This argument will now be illustrated with a brief account
of the shifting approach to contractual interpretation in the UK and the
potential of this approach to facilitate relational contracting.
III THE RISE OF CONTEXTUALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
(a) Relevance to South Africa?
For historical reasons, English contract law has been influential in South
Africa, but sound practical reasons also speak to the value in comparative
study of English contract law. Such reasons would include the extent of
commercial activity and resultant contract adjudication within the English
jurisdiction; the reputation of English contract law for certainty; the
common choice of English law as a governing regime to international
contracts; and the quality of the English legal academic discourse. Finally, for
someone interested in ‘fairness’ in contract, there is an extensive literature on
standards such as good faith and reasonableness in the UK, given new
impetus by recent case-law developments.
(b) The construction of contracts
The UK is of course well known for its tradition of positivism and a doctrinal
approach to law.69 Contract formation and interpretation is viewed as being
objective in English law and there is an established hostility to generally
applicable standards such as good faith in the commercial context.70 Never-
theless, the recent case law in this jurisdiction, particularly following the
judgments of Lord Hoffmann in the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords (the Supreme Court since October 2009) has shown a growing
tendency to concern itself with the context of a contractual transaction. The
starting point for a discussion of this topic must be Lord Hoffmann’s
restatement of the rules of interpretation in Investor’s Compensation Scheme Ltd
v West Bromwich Building Society (only the first three are reproduced below):
‘1. Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge
which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation
in which they were at the time of the contract.
68 Ibid. For negative views on this development, see: Hogg op cit note 11.
69 Compare H L A Hart The Concept of Law (1961) for a famous description of
a nuanced version of (British) positivism. Compare also the comparative study of
P S Atiyah & Robert S Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Com-
parative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (1987).
70 See the detailed account in McKendrick op cit note 40 at 366–84. For a com-
parative study of good faith in English law, see Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zim-
mermann, ‘Good faith in European contract law: Surveying the legal landscape’ in
Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract
Law (2000) 7.
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2. The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the
‘‘matrix of fact’’. ... Subject to the requirement that it should have been
reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned
next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in
which the language of the document would have been understood by a
reasonable man.
3. The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotia-
tions of the parties and their declaration of subjective intent.’71
The reader will immediately note that Lord Hoffmann’s rule one intro-
duces a measure of subjectivity into the interpretation inquiry by the linking
of context to the knowledge of the parties to the contract. Commentators
have described this approach, as I have already indicated, as ‘subjective
objectivity’, since the reader is placed within a particular contextual point of
view, rather than focusing merely on semantics.72 Although Lord Hoffmann
was careful to defend his restatement as being clearly grounded in existing
authority, the shift in emphasis was unsettling to some who were worried
about the open-endedness of what could constitute the ‘factual matrix’73 and
the potential increase in litigation costs resulting from parties leading greater
amounts of evidence.74 Lord Hoffmann’s use of context in the construction
of contracts was firmly entrenched and clarified in following decisions,
however.75 Indeed, this reformulation was extended to the implication of
terms (to flow from a construction of the contract as a whole)76 and
remoteness (does an interpretation of a contract as a whole in its commercial
setting indicate a tacit assumption of risk).77 Lord Hoffmann also defended
his views in his own personal writing.78 Lord Hoffmann retired from the
bench in 2009, leaving his legacy of contextualism to be developed or
distinguished by later Supreme Court judges.
A further development worth mentioning in the context of construction
of the agreements is the shift towards purposive construction, particularly
under the banner of achieving ‘commercial common sense’.79 This interpre-
71 [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at 912–13.
72 Hogg op cit note 11 at 408; Mitchell op cit note 36 at 233.
73 Lord Hoffmann late clarified the meaning of factual matrix as being limited to
‘anything which a reasonable man would have regarded as relevant’ in Bank of Credit
and Commerce International SA v Ali [2001] UKHL 8 para 39.
74 Lord Steyn ‘The intractable problem of the interpretation of legal texts’ (2003)
25 Sydney LR 5 at 8–10; Staughton op cit note 11 at 307.
75 See the judgments of Lord Hoffmann in Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna-
tional SA v Ali supra note 73 and Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL
38.
76 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10 para 16 (per Lord
Hoffmann).
77 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48
para 11 (per Lord Hoffmann).
78 See Lord Hoffmann ‘The intolerable wrestle with words and meanings’ (1997)
114 SALJ 656. See also Lord Steyn op cit note 74.
79 See eg Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland v Lloyd’s Banking Group plc [2013]
UKSC 3 para 21 (per Lord Mance). See too McKendrick op cit note 40 at 381.
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tative standard appears to have evolved contemporaneously with Lord
Hoffmann’s restatement, and to form part of a new approach to interpreta-
tion.80 The role of ‘business common sense’ was squarely raised in the
unanimous Supreme Court decision in Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank, where
Lord Clarke stated: ‘If there are two possible constructions, the court is
entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common
sense and to reject the other.’81
If, under English law, contract interpretation is to be contextual and
purposive, with a preference being given to a commercially sensible
construction, there is significant scope for judicial intervention in deciding
contractual disputes. Some questioned whether this was an appropriate
approach to commercial contracts. Hogg has asked whether a party should be
rescued from her bad bargain (‘commercially unsensible’) by the imposition
of a new commercially sensible bargain by the judiciary.82 Some have
questioned whether judges, usually drawn from the ranks of advocates, have
the experience of contract drafting and of business to determine what
prevailing commercial practices are or even should be.83
Others have been more positive about the potential contract-policing role
which the ‘commercial common sense’ rule can play. Mitchell argues that the
greater element of fact sensitivity in the new approach avoids the tendency to
obscure power and information asymmetries, which may result from
literalism’s focus on semantics.84 This new approach, she argues, indicates a
preference for presenting this process as a choice between interpretative
outcomes, rather than as an imposition of an external standard.85 Hence
contextualism is capable of providing a vehicle for greater fairness in contract
adjudication and perhaps even playing a contract-policing role.86 Similar
sentiments had earlier been expressed by Brownsword, who argued that
context should be used to allow for recognition to be given to a particular
contracting culture: is it more individualist, or more co-operative in
nature?87 He feels that such an inquiry may render a more helpful result than
the use of an externally imposed standard, such as good faith or fair dealing.88
The latest Supreme Court judgment on contractual interpretation seems
to present a shift away from a contract-policing ‘commercial common sense’
80 Compare Lord Napier and Ettrick v RF Kershaw Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 756 at 763
(per Lord Steyn).
81 [2011] UKSC 50 para 21.
82 Hogg op cit note 11 at 419–20.
83 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] CSOH 208
para 24 (per Lord Reed); Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd [2014]
CSIH 43 para 10 (per Lord Drummond-Young, disagreeing with this view).
84 Mitchell op cit note 36 at 234.
85 Ibid at 231–2.
86 Ibid at 235.
87 Brownsword op cit note 62 at 123–7.
88 Ibid at 123.
RELATIONAL THEORY, CONTEXT AND COMMERCIAL COMMON SENSE 309
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
rule back toward literalism. In Arnold v Britton89 the Supreme Court
considered the validity of a contractual formula intended to effect annual
inflationary increases of a service charge levied against individual holiday
properties in a caravan park under separate lease agreements. These were
long-term relational contracts, with some of the leases dating back to the late
1970s. The inflation rate of that period had been running high, sometimes
above 10 per cent per annum, and the formulas were tailored with this
market backdrop in mind to be a flat rate of a 10 per cent increase per annum,
compounded annually. At the date of the hearing, the UK’s inflation was
down to a negligible rate and hence the service charges were completely out
of kilter with market rates. The Supreme Court upheld this pricing
mechanism, however, with only Lord Carnwath dissenting.90
In the main judgment, Lord Neuberger repeated Lord Hoffmann’s rule
one of interpretation, with regard to interpretation being from the point of
view of a reasonable person with all the background knowledge of the
contracting parties, and also stressed the role of the documentary, factual and
commercial context.91 He went on, however, to emphasise seven factors,
first and foremost of which was that ‘commercial common sense and
surrounding circumstances ... should not be invoked to undervalue the
importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed’.92 He
emphasised in this regard the fact that the parties to a contract have control
over the language which they use.93 Another point of interest for present
purposes was the fourth point mentioned, namely that commercial common
sense should not be used to reject a provision because it seemed imprudent
when viewed with the advantage of hindsight.94 The net result was that the
offending portions of the contract were upheld, despite the manifest hardship
caused to the lessees.95
Thus the contextual approach seems to be firmly entrenched, although the
commercial-common-sense rule and the use of this device to police contract
terms may have a more uncertain future. It would also seem that there is a
re-emphasis taking place on the plain meaning of the contract itself.96 Indeed
a contextual factor to consider in interpretation may well be the fact that
detailed planning, complete with legal advice, has gone into the drafting of a
contract, as was decisive for the Court of Appeal in BMA Special Opportunity
89 [2015] UKSC 36.
90 Ibid para 60 (per Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes concur-
ring); para 79 (per Lord Hodge).
91 Ibid para 15.
92 Ibid para 17.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid para 20.
95 See ibid para 60 (per Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes con-
curring); para 79 (per Lord Hodge).
96 It should be noted that a similar shift away from the Lord Hoffmann approach
can be seen with regard to the test for tacit terms in Marks & Spencer plc v BNP Paribas
Securities Services Trust Company Ltd [2015] UKSC 72.
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Hub Fund Ltd v African Minerals Finance Ltd.97 This in itself, may be a sound
contextual reason for preferring a more literal interpretation of a contractual
provision. The fact remains, however, that despite the undermining of the
potentially equitable device of the commercial common sense test in Arnold v
Britton, there is a growing movement in support of protecting reasonable
expectations, or possibly even good faith, in English commercial contract
law, particularly in the setting of long-term relational contracts. The question
whether such a duty exists and its relation (in English law) to the issue of the
construction of a contract will be considered next.
(c) Reasonable expectations/good faith
Much ink has been spilt over the perceived absence of a governing principle
of good faith in English law. The better view would appear to be that while
there is no over-arching external standard as there is in, say, German law,
there are piecemeal solutions to particular problems of bad faith by which
English law ensures that contractual relations are conducted in an acceptable
manner.98 Notions of an implied term of good faith or objective reasonable-
ness in commercial contracts, which would be the English-law approach to
establishing a default rule of contracting, have not traditionally been well
received in the English courts.99 A notable recent departure from this
approach was in the case of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation
Ltd, where a high court judge, Leggatt J, found (obiter) that there was an
implied duty of good faith in English commercial contracts.100 One of the
key features of this case was the relational nature of the contract in question: a
long-term distributorship agreement, giving Yam Seng, a company based in
Singapore, the rights to distribute in parts of Asia fragrances and toiletries
produced by a British company. The relationship in question was a personal
connection between just two men, who represented the interests of their
respective companies and met in person several times and corresponded
often.101 The agreement itself was not drafted by lawyers, but by the parties
themselves, with only vague general terms.102 The relationship broke down
when Yam Seng’s representative purported to terminate the relationship,
alleging bad faith conduct by the representative of ITC and breach of the
97 [2013] EWCACiv 416 paras 24–5.
98 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 2 WLR 615
(CA) at 621 (per Bingham LJ). See further Whittaker & Zimmermann op cit note 70.
99 In the negotiation phase, see Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) at 138 (per
Lord Ackner). In the performance stage, see Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company v
Product Star Shipping Limited [1993] 1 Lloyd’s LR 39 at 404; Ludgate Insurance Company
Limited v Citibank NA [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 221 paras 35–6; Paragon Finance PLC v
Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466 paras 37–42; Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance
Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1047 paras 67–76; Socimer International Bank Limited (in
liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] EWCACiv 116 para 66.
100 Yam Seng supra note 63 paras 119–54.
101 Ibid paras 5–8.
102 Ibid para 26.
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contract.103 Leggatt J found that ITC was indeed in breach and that it had also
made misrepresentations to Yam Seng.104
The interesting part of the judgment is the discussion of an implied duty of
good faith, however. Leggatt J began by stating that English law was not yet
in a position to recognise a term of good faith implied by law in all
commercial contracts.105 He did, however, feel that such a term might be
implied on the facts.106 He noted the influence of the doctrine of good faith
in most civil law systems and in the various attempts to codify a common
European law of contract.107 He also noted the growing impetus in this
direction in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scotland.108 Leggatt J
noted the existence of accepted contractual norms of behaviour, such as
honesty and ‘other standards of commercial dealing’, which should not be
‘improper’, ‘commercially unacceptable’ or ‘unconscionable’.109 A further
issue was ‘fidelity to the bargain’, particularly in a situation where a contract
could not detail every possible eventuality: a purposive construction could
ensure that fidelity was maintained.110 Furthermore (in the same vein) the
requirements of good faith were context sensitive, although the test for what
good faith entailed was objective and depended on a standard of commercial
acceptability to reasonable and honest people.111 Leggatt J described the
contract before him as ‘relational’, which would necessitate ‘a high degree of
communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on mutual
trust and confidence and could involve expectations of loyalty which [were]
not legislated for in the express terms of the contract, but [were] implicit in
the parties understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the
arrangements’.112 This conception of good faith, Leggatt J argued, was not
novel or foreign to English law, but since he had found that good faith was
context sensitive, the law was best developed on a case-by-case approach.113
The impact of this decision in the case law and literature continues to be
felt. The Court of Appeal was quick to distance itself from this approach in
Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd,114
which suggests that Leggatt J’s argument may not take hold immediately, if at
all, in the highest courts of English law. There are recent high court decisions
which have quoted Leggatt J’s dicta on good faith with approval, though,
103 Ibid paras 74–83.
104 Ibid para 230.
105 Ibid para 131.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid para 124.
108 Ibid paras 126–30.
109 Ibid paras 135–8.
110 Ibid para 139.
111 Ibid paras 141–4.
112 Ibid para 142.
113 Ibid para 145.
114 [2013] EWCACiv 200 para 105.
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particularly with regard to long-term relational contract disputes.115 To this
author, writing from a comparative perspective, the usefulness of Leggatt J’s
approach is (with respect) the detailed discussion of what an implied duty of
good faith might entail in a commercial context. This would certainly
include honesty, but may also extend to further duties of commercial fair
dealing. Also important for present purposes is that the content of a duty of
good faith is context dependent, which supports nicely the argument
advanced herein that commercial context should play a role in the adjudica-
tion of contractual disputes, especially those of a relational nature.
The academic reception of the Yam Seng judgment appears mixed.116
Whittaker reiterated his support for the proposition of Lord Steyn that
contract law should give effect to the reasonable expectations of honest
people,117 but felt that an ‘open-textured standard’ to regulate conduct
would lead to uncertainty.118 He also argued that if Yam Seng is interpreted as
allowing the implication of a duty of good faith, this was acceptable, but the
imposition of a generally applicable external standard was not.119 Campbell,
writing from a relational contract theory perspective, was open to the Yam
Seng judgment, provided the duty of good faith rested on the objective
implication of a term based on reasonable commercial expectations, rather
than an external standard.120 This duty would then be ‘endogenously’
determined from an objective, contextual reading of the contract.121
The Lord Steyn argument alluded to by Campbell above and indeed cited
by Leggatt J in Yam Seng presents the concept of good faith in contract in a
manner which is perhaps more palatable to the average English contract
lawyer.122 This argument rests on an alternative concept of the ‘reasonable
expectations of honest men’, which are protected in English contract law
through the use of doctrinal law, rather than a general resort to good faith
itself, and includes inter alia the proper approach to the interpretation of
written contracts.123 Bradgate, in exploring the link between commercial
law and commercial practice, has written in defence of reasonable expecta-
115 See eg Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Exports Pvt Ltd [2014]
EWHC 2104 (Comm) para 51; D&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority [2015] EWHC
226 (QB) paras 174–5.
116 See for a general overview of the case and its subsequent impact Ewan McKen-
drick ‘Good faith in the performance of a contract in English law’ in DiMatteo &
Hogg (eds) op cit note 11 at 196.
117 Simon Whittaker ‘Good faith, implied terms and commercial contracts’ (2013)
129 LQR 463 at 463.
118 Ibid at 468.
119 Ibid at 469.
120 Campbell et al op cit note 62 at 488.
121 Ibid.
122 Lord Steyn op cit note 66, cited in Yam Seng supra note 63 para 145. See further,
for an example of Lord Steyn’s use of reasonable expectations in his judicial capacity,
First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s LR 194 at
201 and 204.
123 Steyn op cit note 122 at 439–41.
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tions as congruent with an objective approach to contracting and contract
interpretation, as well as being sensitive to existing business practices.124
Bradgate argues that by protecting ‘reasonable expectations’, the law is made
more flexible and able to reflect the norms of the business community.125
This reflects again a contextual approach to the imposition of normative
standards in contracting, albeit by a piecemeal, rather than general approach.
A context-sensitive approach to normative adjudication was also suggested
by Wightman, who argued (under the banner of ‘good faith’) for an approach
which took into account the norms and customs of the contracting
community in question, rather than blunt generally imposed standards
(which were better suited to consumer transactions).126
Hence, the typical view of the English commercial contract discourse
appears to be that there is no general standard of good faith in the sense of an
externally imposed duty of objective reasonableness, but more limited norms
are imposed in a context-sensitive manner through the technical doctrines of
contract law. This lends credence to the arguments of relational scholars such
as Mitchell that the use of context (and related concepts such as ‘business
common sense’) has an important role to play in developing relational norms
such as co-operation in existing contract doctrine.127 Rather than applying
flexible standards, English courts appear to resort to context-sensitive
answers at the stage of construction of the agreement.
IV CONTEXT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT
(a) Contextualism in post-constitutional contract law
(i) The final Constitution, 1996
As briefly alluded to above, a major goal of the South African constitutional
enterprise is the transformation of both law and society.128 Part of this process
is the furthering of social-justice aims. Section 2 of the final Constitution
declares this legal text to be the supreme law of South Africa, which the
Constitutional Court has unequivocally interpreted to mean that all law is
subject to the Constitution — there is no separate, sacrosanct sphere of (for
124 Robert Bradgate ‘Contracts, contract law and reasonable expectations’ in Sarah
Worthington (ed) Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (2003) 651 at 666–74.
125 Ibid at 687–90.
126 John Wightman ‘Good faith and pluralism in the law of contract’ in Brown-
sword, Hird & Howells (eds) op cit note 12 at 42-46.
127 Mitchell op cit note 16 at 243–4.
128 This aspect of transformative constitutionalism is much discussed in the litera-
ture on the constitutional development of private law. See by way of introduction
Pius Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 16 Stellenbosch LR 351; Dik-
gang Moseneke ‘Transformative constitutionalism: Its implications for the law of
contract’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch LR 3; Davis & Klare op cit note 59; Karl Klare ‘Legal
culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146.
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instance) commercial contract law.129 Section 39(2) of the final Constitution
further declares that the common law should be developed in accordance
with the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights.
As the subsequent case law of the Constitutional Court has made clear, this
means that contract law, even commercial contract law, must be sensitive to
the context of the South African situation, with its attendant socio-economic
challenges.130 Through the medium of indirect development of the common
law, the Constitutional Court has attempted to bring contract law into line
with its own view of contractual justice.131 This development is also
mirrored in a wide array of statutes aiming to ameliorate specific aspects of
the law of contract, particularly in sectors where there is inequality of
bargaining power, such as employment law, consumer law and the law of
residential leases.132 The legislative and judicial context in which South
African commercial contract law operates has thus changed dramatically in its
post-apartheid setting.
(ii) Academic discourse
In the interests of brevity, this article will consider the positions of just two
scholars who have written on South African constitutional/contract law with
reference to the role of context. The first of these, Wallis, a justice of the
Supreme Court of Appeal, has written several times in his personal capacity
in defence of a more commercial perspective being brought to bear on the
constitutional development of contract law, often at variance with views
expressed by the Constitutional Court.133 The second, Bhana, an academic at
a South African university, has often written in favour of a stronger role for
human rights considerations and greater constitutional development of the
existing common law of contract, usually with the emphasis being placed on
protecting the weaker party.134 Without engaging with the merits of what is
129 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & another: In re ex parte President of the
Republic of South Africa & others 2000 (2) SA674 (CC) para 44.
130 See (for example) the passages cited above at note 8. See also the minority
judgment dictum of Yacoob J in Everfresh supra note 12 para 23.
131 Authority for indirect horizontality in a contractual setting may be found in
Barkhuizen supra note 9 paras 27–30. For the Constitutional Court developing the
law of contract see, in addition to the cases in notes 8 and 10 supra, Maphango v Aengus
Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC); Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014
(4) SA474 (CC); Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 (6) SA315 (CC).
132 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of
1997; National Credit Act 34 of 2005; Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; Rental
HousingAct 50 of 1999.
133 See on interpretation Wallis op cit note 40. On constitutional/contract law, see
Wallis op cit note 66; Malcolm Wallis ‘The common law’s Cool Ideas for dealing with
Ms Hubbard’ (2015) 132 SALJ 940.
134 Deeksha Bhana & Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and
constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2006) 123 SALJ 865; Deeksha
Bhana ‘The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: A reconciliation of sections 8
and 39 of the Constitution’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 351; Deeksha Bhana ‘The role of
judicial method in contract revisited’ (2015) 132 SALJ 122; Deeksha Bhana &
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in both cases a detailed jurisprudential vision for the constitutional develop-
ment of contract law, this article will attempt to reconcile a common element
of both authors’writing, namely an argument for a greater resort to context.
Wallis has argued both in his personal and judicial capacities for an
objective, contextual approach to the interpretation of commercial agree-
ments, drawing extensively on the work of Lord Hoffmann.135 For example,
in his analysis of the Everfresh decision, Wallis brings his advocacy, judicial
(and indeed personal) experience to bear on the dispute, highlighting the fact
that many evictions simply involve the lessee playing for time.136 This type of
practical insight, difficult to incorporate into a decision based on a literal
interpretation of a written contract, is a highly relevant contextual factor to
be determined from the surrounding factual matrix and indeed from
‘commercial common sense’. It is hard to dispute the contention that
commercial law should reflect commercial practice and business norms.
Bhana’s arguments highlight the very real plight of a large proportion of
the South African population, who lack the education, financial literacy, or
resources to compete on a level playing field with better-resourced commer-
cial contracting parties. This issue of inequality of bargaining power is an
extremely important one and goes to the heart of debates around improperly
obtained consensus, mistake in contract formation, capacity to contract, and
indeed the validity and enforceability of contract terms.137 These too are
contextual factors: indeed Bhana has explicitly called for greater subjective
awareness in contract adjudication, demanding that courts inquire who the
parties to a contract are and under what circumstances they contracted.138
This is an argument for social justice in contract law, which is highly
necessary in the post-apartheid contracting context.
The reconciliation which this article will offer between the schools of
thought represented by Wallis and Bhana is that they are both concerned
with incorporating a greater role for context in contract adjudication.
Perhaps the distinction is that Bhana is more consumer focused and Wallis
more commercially orientated. The argument to be advanced herein will
focus on commercial, rather than consumer, disputes, which in the opinion
of this author should be clearly distinguished from consumer-related transac-
tions and treated with appropriate regard for their commercial context. This
article will hence not offer insights on the proper approach to inequality of
bargaining power. (Although this admittedly may be an issue in commercial
transactions too, there is arguably less scope for abuse.) The problem to be
Anmari Meerkotter ‘The impact of the Constitution on the common law of contract:
Botha v Rich NO (CC)’ (2015) 132 SALJ 494.
135 For Wallis’s personal writing, see Wallis op cit note 40 (on interpretation). For
Wallis’s SCA judgments on the proper approach to interpretation, see (inter alia):
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund supra note 8; Comwezi Security Services [2014]
ZASCA22; Bothma-Batho Transport supra note 8.
136 Wallis op cit note 66 at 557–61.
137 Bhana 2015 SALJ op cit note 134 at 134–44.
138 Bhana & Meerkotter op cit note 134 at 504–5.
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addressed below and in part V which follows is how to create context-
sensitive doctrinal law, capable of applying commercial practices in a
commercial dispute resolution setting.
(b) Relational contracts
(i) Doctrinal law
Long-term relational contracts, where co-operation and trust are vital, are of
course as prevalent in the South African case law as in the UK.139 There are
several doctrinal areas of relevance in disputes involving this type of contract,
particularly: certainty and the validity of ‘agreements to agree’; interpretation
of contracts; and how to deal with the problem of changed circumstances.
The validity of an ‘agreement to agree’ provision was squarely before the
Constitutional Court in Everfresh,140 which will be discussed in detail in
part V. I have written previously on so-called ‘duty to negotiate in good faith’
clauses and whether or not these should be binding.141 The point for
relational contracts is that it is difficult for parties to a long-term relationship
fully to anticipate the future, necessitating a certain amount of vagueness in
contract drafting to facilitate future negotiation. The law on this issue was
previously settled by the SCA in Southernport Developments: to be enforceable,
a duty to negotiate provision must have a deadlock-breaking mechanism,
such as an arbitration clause.142 Absent this, such a provision may well be too
vague to enforce and hence reflect merely an aspiration, rather than a binding
provision.143 This would appear to also be the law in the UK144 and is
arguably in line with ‘commercial common sense’, which would probably
139 See by way of example NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC & others;
Deeb & another v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928
(SCA) (the power of a bank to adjust interest rates in a mortgagor/mortgagee rela-
tionship); South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA)
(‘SAFCOL’) (the power of supplier to adjust purchase price in a long-term supply
contract); Transnet Ltd v Rubenstein 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA) (the power of a train
company to terminate a contract granting a business owner permission to operate a
shop on the train); Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468
(SCA) (the power of a bank to terminate a long-standing bank/customer relation-
ship); Silent Pond Investments CC v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 2011 (6) SA 343 (D) (the
power of a franchisor to establish a rival outlet in close proximity to the franchisee’s
business).
140 Supra note 12.
141 Andrew Hutchison ‘Agreements to agree: Can there ever be an enforceable
duty to negotiate in good faith’ (2011) 128 SALJ 273. In retrospect, my contention at
294–5 that an agreement to agree provision which is not accompanied by an arbitra-
tion clause should be possible of specific performance through court-ordered
appointment of an arbitrator is perhaps slightly over-stated and best read in the con-
text of bad faith conduct by the party refusing to negotiate. As discussed below in part
five with particular reference to the Everfresh case, this author is not of the opinion
that Shoprite’s refusal to renew Everfresh’s lease was in bad faith.
142 Southernport Developments supra note 63 para 17.
143 Ibid paras 15–16, citing the Australian case of Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v
Sijehama (Pty) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1.
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value the freedom not to contract145 above the relationship-dependent
notion of co-operation.
The correct approach to the interpretation of contracts in South Africa has
gone through a period of fairly rapid development in recent times.146 The
Supreme Court of Appeal has come out strongly in favour of an objective,
contextual, purposive approach.147 This reflects the UK developments set
out above. It also reflects a move away from literalism and formalist
decision-making in post-apartheid South African legal interpretation, as can
clearly be seen in the Constitutional Court’s approach to the interpretation of
statutes.148 As to the role of standards such as commercial common sense,
reasonable expectations, or good faith in contractual interpretation, these
have often played a decisive role.149 Perhaps the most memorable instance
was the use of ‘good faith’ in interpreting the obligations of the parties in
SAFCOL v York Timbers.150 Here the SCA, despite taking a conservative
stance on the role of good faith as not constituting an independently
enforceable duty in contract law in one part of the judgment,151 nevertheless
found York to be in breach of contract, due to its continued efforts to
frustrate SAFCOL’s exercise of its rights to adjust the terms of the contract.152
This case represents a clear use of good faith in contractual interpretation to
address an issue of bad faith failure to co-operate under a long-term relational
contract.153
The appropriate way in which to address the problem of changed
circumstances at common law has not yet been considered by the Constitu-
tional Court.154 Although the South African Law Commission proposed
144 See Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) at 138 (per Lord Ackner). See, how-
ever, the obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal in Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA
Petrobas [2005] EWCA Civ 891 paras 115–21, to the effect that the question of
enforceability of such a clause may depend on how it is drafted. For more detailed
discussion of this question, see Michael Furmston & G J Tolhurst Contract Formation:
Law and Practice (2010) ch 12.
145 See Wendell H Holmes ‘The freedom not to contract’ (1985–1986) 60 Tulane
LR 751.
146 Compare the dicta of the unanimous SCA in Comwezi supra note 135 para 5
(plain meaning approach ‘no longer appropriate’); Bothma-Batho Transport supra note
8 para 12 (old approach cited by counsel ‘no longer consistent’with new approach).
147 See the cases cited above at note 146.
148 See the cases cited above at note 8.
149 See Zimmermann op cit note 12 at 242–3.
150 Supra note 139.
151 Ibid para 27.
152 Ibid paras 32–4.
153 Compare the findings of Brand JA in paras 35–6.
154 For South African academic discussion, see Andrew Hutchison ‘The doctrine of
frustration: A solution to the problem of changed circumstances in South African
contract law?’ (2010) 127 SALJ 84 and ‘Gap filling to address changed circumstances
in contract law — When it comes to losses and gains sharing is the fair solution’ (2010)
21 Stellenbosch LR 414.
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legislation on this issue as long ago as the 1990s,155 this was never enacted and
at present the South African law of contract knows no specific doctrine to
alleviate hardship due to changed circumstances.156 Existing doctrinal mech-
anisms such as interpretation (as per SAFCOL above); refusal to award
specific performance (as per Haynes v King William’s Town Municipality);157 or
supervening impossibility (for which the change of circumstances must be
objective and absolute)158 are not fully capable of addressing all forms of
hardship.159 A potential avenue of redress using a failed common supposition
as to the future to render a contract void was cut short by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO.160 It is my hope that the
future development of the South African law of contract will find a way to
deal with this vital aspect of relational contracting.
(ii) Relational contract theory
Relational contract theory is not a particularly well-developed branch of
South African contract scholarship, although there are traces of it in the
literature.161 It has also had a certain impact in debates outside of contract
law, such as the proper approach to traditional land ownership.162 I believe
that this branch of legal theory has a lot to offer, particularly in the
post-apartheid contract-law setting. Relational theory would lend support to
the rise of flexible standards in the common law of contract, as appears to be
heralded by several dicta of the Constitutional Court. The emphasis on
contextual factors such as the identity and inter-dependence of contracting
parties, as well as on customary commercial norms in a given business
community, may provide the theoretical backbone for a more communitarian
law of contract which still has commercial values and economic realism at its
heart.
As has been illustrated above, there is support for this branch of legal
theory even in the unlikely source of English case law and academic
155 South African Law Commission (Project 47) Report on Unreasonable Stipulations
in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (1998) 208–18. See clause 4 of the draft bill
for the suggested provisions on hardship.
156 Compare the discussion in R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of
Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) at 547–9.
157 1951 (2) SA371 (A) at 381B–E.
158 See Christie & Bradfield op cit note 156 at 547; L F van Huyssteen, G F Lubbe &
M F B Reinecke Contract: General Principles 5 ed (2016) 517ff.
159 See Hutchison 2010 Stellenbosch LR op cit note 154 at 414 for discussion of the
hardship problem and the deficiencies of the current SouthAfrican approach.
160 2002 (4) SA 264 (SCA) para 8. The relevant case law and the concept of a
supposition as to the future is discussed in Andrew Hutchison ‘What’s so wrong with
Williams v Evans? An examination of the concept of the supposition in futuro’ (2008)
125 SALJ 441.
161 See especially the work of Hawthorne, cited above in note 1.
162 See Aninka Claassens & Sindiso Mnisi ‘Rural women redefining land rights in
the context of living customary law’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 491. (This article draws on the
relational theory scholarship of (the Canadian) Jennifer Nedelsky.)
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literature.163 The important, balancing point which comes out in the
relational contract theory writing is that it is not an external normative
standard of good faith which should be imposed, but an endogenous form of
fair-dealing to be derived from an objective, contextual study of the parties’
own interactions and immediate commercial backdrop.164 An external
standard may, however, be appropriate in a consumer setting, and indeed
such a normative framework has been enacted through the mechanism of
several statutes.165 In the latter, commercial, setting it is the norms of the
business community which should govern. Indeed, the words of one of
relational theory’s pioneering scholars, Ian Macneil, infused as they are with a
healthy dose of economic realism, may suggest what relational theory is really
about in a commercial setting:
‘The word ‘‘solidarity’’ (or ‘‘trust’’) is not inappropriate to describe this web of
interdependence, externally reinforced as well as self-supporting, and expected
future co-operation. The most important aspect of solidarity ... is the extent to
which it produces similarity of selfish interests. ... [S]imilarity of interests may
be produced by external forces such as sovereign law. But ... solidarity may and
does arise internally in relations.’166
Solidarity is a key theme of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on
contract, most commonly expressed using the African term, ‘ubuntu’.167
Ubuntu, good faith and other standards expressing an aspirational code of
conduct for contracting parties, were referred to in both judgments of the
Constitutional Court in the Everfresh case in discussing the enforceability of
an ‘agreement to agree’ provision.168 The relevance of this particular
decision, as one particular example from a growing line of constitutional/
contract decisions from the Constitutional Court, was that it was a purely
commercial dispute, with no proven inequality of bargaining power, and it
involved a long-term relational contract, namely a commercial lease. This
case will be briefly analysed below to illustrate the preceding discussion.
163 See part III(c) above.
164 This point is made forcefully in Campbell et al op cit note 62.
165 See the statutes cited at note 132 above. See also the argument of Wightman op
cit note 62 at 42–6.
166 Ian Macneil ‘Economic analysis of contractual relations: Its shortfalls and the
need for a ‘‘rich classificatory apparatus’’ ’ (1981) 75 Northwestern University LR 1018 at
1034.
167 See by way of example Barkhuizen supra note 9 para 51; Everfresh supra note 12
paras 24 and 72. For secondary sources, see generally Yvonne Mokgoro ‘Ubuntu and
the law in South Africa’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights LR 15; T W Bennett ‘Ubuntu:
An African equity’ in Frank Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity: Flexible Legal
Principles in Developing a Contemporary Jurisprudence (2011) 3; Drucilla Cornell &
Nyoko Muvangua Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Post-Apartheid Jurisprudence
(2012).
168 Everfresh supra note 12 paras 24 (per Yacoob J) and 72 (per Moseneke DCJ).
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V A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF EVERFRESH
(a) Facts and proceedings
This case concerned a commercial lease by the applicant, Everfresh, of
premises in a shopping centre owned by the respondent, Shoprite. Shoprite
was the successor in title to Everfresh’s previous landlord and had taken over
the lease. The dispute in this case concerned a clause permitting renewal of
the lease, subject (inter alia) to agreement on an appropriate rental. Given the
nature of the analysis to follow, I will reproduce the relevant parts of the
clause in dispute:
‘Provided that the Lessee has faithfully and timeously fulfilled and performed all
its obligations under and in terms of this Lease, the Lessee shall have the right to
renew same for a further period of four years and eleven months commencing
on 1st April 2009, such renewal to be upon the same terms and conditions as in
this Lease contained save that there shall be no further right of renewal, and save
that the rentals for the renewal period shall be agreed upon between the Lessor
and the Lessee at the time. The said right of renewal is subject to the Lessee
giving written notice to the Lessor of its intention so to renew, which notice
shall reach the Lessor not less than six (6) calendar months prior to the date of
termination of this Lease. In the event of no such notice being received by the
Lessor, or in the event of notice being duly received but the Parties failing to
reach agreement in regard to the rentals for the renewal period at least three (3)
calendar months prior to the date of termination of this Lease, then in either
event this right of renewal shall be null and void.’169
Within the time periods stated in this clause, Everfresh gave Shoprite
notice of its intention to exercise its ‘option’ to renew the lease. Shoprite
wrote back, claiming that the above clause did not give an enforceable right
of renewal and that it refused to renew the lease since it wished to redevelop
the shopping centre. Shoprite stated that it might reconsider its position
following the refurbishment. This led to ejectment proceedings in the high
court, where Shoprite was successful on the basis that the clause was too
vague to be enforceable.170 Further grounds for this decision were that there
was no readily ascertainable external standard of good faith.171 Leave to
appeal was refused by the high court and by the Supreme Court of Appeal.172
In the Constitutional Court, Everfresh conceded that the high court had
been correct on the common-law position, but argued that constitutional
development of the common law was necessary.173 Essentially, the argument
was that it should be entitled to its right of renewal at a reasonable rental,
since this was implied ex lege by clause 3.174 In the alternative, Shoprite’s
169 This clause is reproduced from the Yacoob judgment in Everfresh supra note 12
para 3.
170 Ibid paras 10–11.
171 Ibid para 11.
172 Ibid para 12.
173 Ibid para 61 (per Moseneke DCJ).
174 Ibid.
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discretion whether to renew the lease had to be exercised reasonably
(‘arbitrium boni viri’), which obliged the landlord to negotiate reasonably.175
In the further alternative, constitutional values required the recognition of a
duty to negotiate in good faith on both parties.176
For the majority (per Moseneke DCJ, six further justices concurring) this
constitutional argument had been raised too late in proceedings.177 Out of
fairness to Shoprite and due to the importance of the issue at stake, which had
now not been considered by the courts below, Everfresh’s appeal had to
fail.178 In an obiter dictum, however, Moseneke DCJ did add:
‘Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s argument, the underlying notion of good
faith in contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements
seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of Ubuntu, which
inspires much of our constitutional compact, may tilt the argument in its
favour.’179
For the minority (per Yacoob J, three further justices concurring) the
matter should have been referred back to the high court with the instruction
to develop the common law. Yacoob J argued:
‘A common law principle that renders an obligation to negotiate enforceable
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the sanctity of contract and the important
moral denominator of good faith. Indeed, the enforceability of a principle of
this kind accords with and is an important component of the process of the
development of a new constitutional contractual order.’180
His suggested way of achieving this was to read the clause as obliging
Shoprite to make at least one counter-offer.181
(b) Analysis
The Constitutional Court focused in both judgments on whether there was a
duty to negotiate on a party to a preliminary ‘agreement to agree’ and, if so,
whether this had to be done in good faith.182 In my analysis, I would like to
highlight a few key issues.
First, this was a purely commercial dispute. Moseneke DCJ noted that
both parties had been legally represented before and during litigation in all
the courts.183 There had been no claim by Everfresh that its legal representa-
tion had been inadequate or that it had been poorly advised.184 There was
hence no proven inequality of bargaining power; indeed the majority
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid paras 63–7.
178 Ibid paras 78–80.
179 Ibid para 72.
180 Ibid para 36.
181 Ibid para 35.
182 Yacoob J notes in para 14 that the Constitutional Court had issued directions
asking the parties for written argument on this point.
183 Ibid para 66.
184 Ibid.
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judgment notes that Everfresh appears to have benefited by the lengthy delay
of its eviction due to the appeal process.185 Assuming that there is a standard
of good faith applicable to the negotiation phase of contracting, the
commercial nature of the agreement should surely have implications when
determining what is reasonable in the context of the parties’ dispute.
Secondly, this provision turned on the interpretation of the renewal clause
reproduced above. It should be noted that this renewal clause was differently
worded to the standard ‘duty to negotiate in good faith’ clause. Notably there
is no express duty of good faith, thus this would have to be applied on the
facts or ex lege. Furthermore, there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism:
Southernport Developments requires a method of resolving potential disputes
during the negotiation phase for such a clause to be enforceable.186 An
example of such a provision, as in that case and in SAFCOL, would be to
insert an arbitration clause by which disagreement could be authoritatively
settled.187 Not only did the disputed clause in Everfresh not contain such a
provision, it stated that in the event of the parties failing to reach agreement,
that provision would be null and void. A literal reading of this clause must
surely indicate that the reasonable meaning of the text is that the parties’
contemplated that the clause would be unenforceable should the parties fail
to reach agreement on the terms of renewal, as was the case on the facts. Thus
a duty to negotiate (in good faith) beyond the plain meaning of the provision
must either rest on the implication of such a term into the contract or a
development of the default rules of the common law of contract.
This introduces the third point: if there is to be a duty to negotiate implied
by law into this type of rent renewal provision, does this not infringe the
fundamental opposing principle, namely that freedom to contract involves
the freedom not to contract? Should the express terms of the agreement not
hold sway in the absence of a proven inequality of bargaining power, with no
right of renewal? Moseneke DCJ suggests as much when he states even a
‘ ‘‘developed’’ common law ... would not compel the respondent to agree to a
renewal of the lease’.188 What does it compel then? The answer must surely
lie in contractual interpretation: did the parties intend this provision to be
enforceable (and hence would have inserted a deadlock-breaking mecha-
nism) or unenforceable (and hence provided for voidness in the event of a
failure to agree)?
The final point is about good faith. If the reader has disagreed with the
argument above on freedom of contract and interpretation and maintains
that there should be a duty to negotiate and to do so in good faith, then I
would argue that a clearer definition as to what constitutes good faith, or the
related concept of ubuntu, is required. The type of detailed unpacking of
these concepts as per Leggatt J in Yam Seng should be undertaken by our
185 Ibid. This view is echoed in Wallis’s analysis: op cit note 66 at 558–9.
186 Southernport Developments supra note 63 para 17.
187 Ibid para 3; SAFCOL supra note 139 para 4.
188 Everfresh supra note 12 para 78.
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highest court in the interests of legal certainty. The authoritative statement
on the role of good faith in South African contract law remains the majority
decision in Barkhuizen v Napier.189 There Ncgobo J confirmed the SCA
position in Brisley190 that ‘[g]ood faith ... has a creative, a controlling and a
legitimating or explanatory function’;191 and that ‘[t]he concepts of justice,
reasonableness and fairness constitute good faith’.192 Since this dictum has
not been overruled, it would appear that a limited role for an independent
doctrine of good faith still prevails. This is a safer commercial standpoint than
a loosely conceived equitable discretion, since commercial contracting
through legal representatives is about ex ante planning and risk allocation. Ex
post determination based on a broadly conceived judicial discretion under-
mines the commercial utility of a written contract.
(c) A relational viewpoint
This article has set out briefly the concept of relational contracting. Lease is a
form of contract which has strong relational elements, due to the extended
duration of the contractual relationship and the need for the parties to
interact through the performance of obligations such as payment of the rental
and observation of the shopping centre’s rules on the tenant’s side, and duties
such as ongoing maintenance on the lessor’s side. Flexibility as to future
circumstances is necessary in a long-term contractual relationship, as was
reflected in the wording of the clause in dispute. Good faith is essential in a
relational contract in order to preserve the relationship. This is good-faith
behaviour, however. Good faith as a legally enforceable duty should best be
determined objectively, with reference to the context of contracting.193 The
test of what is a reasonable expectation in the context of the parties’
relationship works well here. Shoprite was honest in disclosing its motivation
for not wanting to negotiate further and indeed, surely the legal representa-
tion of both parties had advised at the conclusion of the initial lease
agreement that the renewal clause was unenforceable. Everfresh’s arguments
essentially called for a duty of fiduciary loyalty on the part of Shoprite194 — in
189 Supra note 9.
190 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA1 (SCA) para 22.
191 Ibid para 82.
192 Ibid.
193 Compare the comparative English views in part III(c) above.
194 For the view of the Canadian Supreme Court on this issue, see Bhasin v Hrynew
[2014] SCC 71, where the court was careful to state in para 86 that: ‘The duty of
honest performance ... should not be confused with a duty of disclosure or of fidu-
ciary loyalty. A party to a contract has no general duty to subordinate his or her
interest to that of the other party.’
This is in part supported by Yam Seng supra note 63 para 142, subject to Leggatt J’s
view that some ‘relational’ contracts may require a ‘high degree of communication,
cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and
involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the
contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding and necessary to give business
efficacy to the arrangements’. I would distinguish this particular dictum of Leggatt J
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other words that Shoprite should put Everfresh’s interests ahead of its own.
While this type of duty may exist in certain recognised fiduciary contexts,
and may even play a role in certain types of consumer contract, I would argue
it is not appropriate in a fully commercial contractual setting, such as the lease
in question in Everfresh.
VI CONCLUSION
This article has defended the important role which context has to play in
contract law, particularly through the mechanism of contractual interpreta-
tion. This is a useful method by which the surrounding factual matrix,
including the circumstances of the parties and indeed constitutional values,
can be brought to bear on a contractual text. The UK has moved in this
direction from the late twentieth century onwards, although the use of
flexible standards such as commercial common sense to police contracts
remains controversial. South Africa’s increasingly communitarian outlook on
contracting may be more fertile ground for this type of approach, but I would
stress that in determining the factual context, a clear distinction should be
drawn between commercial contracts concluded by legally represented
parties and those which are subject to specific consumer regimes. In a
business-to-business dispute greater scope should be given to considerations
as to what constitutes a legitimate commercial expectation in the context of
that particular contracting community.
Relational theory works best with long-term contracts where there is a
clear element of interdependence between the parties and factors such as trust
and co-operation are necessary. Flexibility may be necessary in contract
drafting here, and may be a fundamental aspect of contract behaviour in
resultant business relationships, but the strict doctrinal law should remain
certain and determinable. This facilitates negotiation and dispute resolution,
particularly when ‘end-game’ norms govern interactions.195 If good faith is
to be a governing standard in commercial contracting, it should be deter-
mined objectively in the context of the parties’ own relationship and
agreement. The Constitutional Court should adhere to its majority defini-
tion of this concept in Barkhuizen and attempt to maintain a clearly
circumscribed sphere for its application. This article would not advocate
using good faith as an independent external standard of objective reasonable-
ness, capable of being invoked directly by a litigant. Rather, it should be
from the position argued for in the main text above on the facts of the respective cases
in question.
195 Bernstein op cit note 34 at at 1796–1802 argues that there is a distinction
between ‘relationship-preserving norms’, which exist when there is co-operation
under a contract, and ‘end-game norms’, which exist when the relationship breaks
down and dispute resolution may become necessary. Bernstein argues (with reference
to empirical research amongst merchants trading under the US Uniform Commercial
Code) that merchants do not necessarily want relationship-preserving norms govern-
ing their end-game dispute, and would thus prefer strict rules rather than flexible
standards at this stage.
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derived from the express or implied terms of the contract itself. Certainly
there should be no duty of fiduciary loyalty in non-fiduciary transactions.
Finally, a key point about relational contracts is that these usually only
reach the courts once the business relationship has broken down. This means
that relational norms no longer operate and an application of hard doctrinal
law is necessary. A far superior form of relationship-preserving dispute
resolution could be sought through commercial mediation where possible,
which would facilitate negotiation and avoid a winner-takes-all situation.196
This, after all, keeps relational disputes within the boundaries of the
contractual relationship and avoids reference to the doctrinal law, which may
not be adaptable to the nuances of a given contractual fact matrix.
196 This argument is made by Linda Mulcahy ‘Telling tales about relational con-
tracts: How do judges learn about the lived world of contracts’ in Campbell, Mulcahy
& Wheeler (eds) op cit note 1 at 205–13. See further John Brand, Felicity Steadman &
Christopher Todd Commercial Mediation: A User’s Guide (2012) ch 2 (concept of
mediation) and 52–4 (relational contracts).
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